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IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.'
The economic desire of men to associate in groups so
organized as best to accomplish the purposes of their as-
sociation is fully recognized and protected by our system
of law. Associates may nowadays attain limited liability
for one or all of their number, may acquire the right to sue
and be sued in a common name, the right to .make contracts
and to do other acts in the name of the group, the right to
receive, hold, and convey title to real estate, and the right
to effectuate an organization such that the directors or other
official representatives shall under ordinary circunistances
alone be authorized to act for the -group. Men are every
day associating in the pursuit of some activity and are seek-
ing to attain some or all of the privileges above enumerated.
It is true that their association usually takes place with
reference to some statute and that the steps- which they
'This article is a preliminary study for a chapter on Irregular Asso-
ciations in a work on the Law of Association which the writer has in
course of preparation.
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take to perfect their organization are taken in more or less
strict compliance with statutory requirements. If, however,
we say that the statute forms these groups, we are using
language which, after all, is merely fictional. It is the
individuals who possess the economic desire to associate
upon certain terms and the organization of the association
is their own act. The real question is not whether the state
makes the association but whether the form of organization
adopted by the associates shall be recognized as legitimate
and whether effect shall be given to their desires. If the
associates comply exactly with the terms upon which their
association is legalized by some statute, an affirmative
answer to this question will be given without hesitation.
The difficulty arises when the associates fail to comply with
some of the provisions of the statute or when it turns out
that the statute does not sanction the particular kind of
association that the associates undertake to form. Shall it
be said that the inevitable consequence of non-compliance
with the terms of the statute or of an absence of statutory
authority is that no effect at all shall be given to the effort
at association? Or shall it, on the other hand, be said that
in private litigation between the associates and other citizens
the question of compliance or non-compliance is immaterial:
that the associates shall be recognized as possessing the
privileges which they desire, subject to the right of the state
to discipline them for their irregular action? Or shall a
middle position be taken and shall the courts undertake to
say that state sanction is essential to the valid exercise of
the privileges but that there are degrees of non-compliance,
and that while some irregularities are fatal to the claims of
the associates other irregularities will not be so regarded?
The problem is not dissimilar to that which arises re-
specting the nature and existence of the marriage status.
A man and a woman live together and announce themselves
to the world as husband and wife. They have failed to
comply with the requirement of the state that marriage shall
be solemnized before a designated official and only in pur-
suance of a license duly granted. Shall it be said that the
failure to comply with the statutory requirement prevents
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the parties from attaining the marriage status? Or shall
it be said that it is the parties who make the marriage, not
the state; and that the usual legal incidents will result from
their association subject to the right of the state to punish
the parties for their dereliction? In case of marriage we
have no hesitation in rejecting the former and in accepting
the latter view. Reasons in plenty may be given in support
of the position that there is no greater justification for say-
ing that the state makes corporations than for saying. that
the state makes marriages 2
Taking up in their order the questions suggested above
respecting the effect of non-compliance with statutory re-
quirements, it may be said that, except in a few instances to
be hereafter considered, courts do not regard the mere fact
of non-compliance as fatal to the claims of the associates.
On the other hand, there is to be found in the books no
definite recognition of the extreme view that the question
of compliance or non-compliance is immaterial. While the
tendency in this direction is definite and strong, the great
majority of decided cases are the record of attempts to pur-
sue a course between the two extremes and to draw a dis-
tinction between material and immaterial non-compliance.
The obvious reason for this course is found in the per-
sistence of the Concession Theory-the theory of those who
hold that incorporation can be attained only by grant from
the sovereign.
From the first, however, the pressure upon the courts has
been uniform in the direction of according to associates the
right to enjoy the advantages of the corporate status merely
in virtue of the fact that they have organized a group on
representative principles and are engaged in business in
corporate form. The history of this branch of the law is
the story of the way in which the courts have yielded to the
pressure, all the while vainly trying to place limits to their
concessions. In the decided cases the problem is not, of
course, discussed in its abstract form, but always with refer-
' See Professor Maitland's Introduction (p. xxxvii) to Gierke's
Political Theories of the Middle Ages. Cambridge: The University
Press. i9oo.
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ence to the claim of a plaintiff that some particular corporate
privilege or immunity is present or absent. The concrete
questions which have arisen may be enumerated as follows:
(I) Questions as to the liability of the associates: are they
liable without limit as principals? (II) As to their right
to make contracts and do other acts in the common name:
is this mode of united action to be permitted to them? (III)
As to their right to sue: may they sue in the common name?
(IV) As to their amenability to suit: may they be sued
in the common name? (V) As to the taking, holding, and
conveying of title to property: may they receive -convey-
ances and give deeds in the common name? (VI) As to
their rights intcr sese: may one invoke as against his fel-
lows rights and remedies inconsistent with the status which
they claim? It will be seen at a glance that the problem of
liability is the one likely to present the greatest difficulty.
This is true not only because of the importance to the asso-
ciates of the question involved, but also because of the
persistence of the common-law idea that every principal
shall be liable without limit for his own acts and the acts
of his representatives. In the discussion of the problem of
limited liability we can see most clearly the working of two
conflicting interests-the interest of the creditor to pursue
his claim to full satisfaction and the interest of the associates
to confine the creditor's recovery to the common property
which they have embarked in the enterprise. Before begin-
ning a consideration of the problems in the order given
above, it should be noted that the significance of a decision
which accords corporate rights to associates is directly pro-
portioned to the strength of the common-law principle
against which the associates happen to be contending. For a
court to hold that associates may sue or be sued in a com-
mon name is a less important decision than to hold that a
deed given by them in the common name operates to pass
title and far less important than to hold that a creditor has
no recourse to the separate estates of his debtors.
Attention should also be called to a matter of terminology.
Irrespective of the theory upon which corporate privileges
are conceded to persons irregularly associated, it is cus-
IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.
tomary to say that such persons are "a de facto corpora-
tion." The contrast is with persons regularly -organized,
who are said to be incorporated de jure. The term "de
facto corporation" may have different meanings according
to the view taken upon certain fundamental questions. If
one adheres to the concession theory, the term means either
nothing or that in spite of irregularities the associates have
received corporate privilege from the state. The difficulties
in the way of using this term consistently with the conces-
sion theory are obvious in cases where there is no law
authorizing association or where the law is unconstitutional
or where on rational principles of interpretation the asso-
ciates have failed to satisfy conditions precedent to the
grant. On the other hand, if one rejects the concession
theory, the term implies that all corporate organization is
in fact the act of the associates. Unlicensed corporate or-
ganization constitutes a group de facto. Licensed organiza-
tion results in forming a group de jure-that is, in all re-
spects according to legal requirement.
I. THE PROBLEM OF LIABImTY.-The question now to
be discussed is whether in cases of irregular organization
unlimited liability can be enforced against the associates as
principals. It is sometimes said that the question is whether
the associates are liable as partners. This statement of the
problem is too narrow. The group may or may not be one
which in the absence of statutory organization would be
regarded as a partnership. B, C, and others associated
themselves in corporate form for the.purpose of having a
public street graded, but they failed to comply with the re-
quirements of the corporation law in certain respects which
the court regarded as material. It did not appear that their
association had profit for its object. B and C were chosen
as secretary and vice-president of the association. In the
common name a contract for doing the work of grading
was made with X. A, a laborer, having quit work, was in-
duced to return by the alleged promise of B and C that the
association would pay him. He subsequently sued B, C,
and other associates to recover his wages. A recovered
a verdict. The court were of opinion that the case was not
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one of partnership but that the liability of the defendants
must rest upon ordinary principles of contract and agency.
They were further of opinion that the question of fact re-
specting the agency of the defendants had been properly
submitted to the jury.3 It is, of course, assumed that the
liability of a principal cannot successfully be asserted against
a defendant until the fact of agency has been established.
In Johnson v. Corser, supra, one of the defendants had exe-
cuted the articles of association but did not contribute or
subscribe to the common fund and took no part in the or-
ganization. The court, however, left the question of his
principalship to the jury because there was evidence tending
to show that he knew that the work was being carried on in
behalf of the associates and that he was present at the making
of the agreement in suit. Where, however, there" was no
evidence that a defendant had taken any part in. the business
of an irregularly organized group and had given no au-
thority to anyone to act for him, excepting such as could be
inferred from the mere fact that he had signed the articles
of incorporation, it was held to be error to leave the question
of his liability to the jury.'
Let it now be assumed, as a typical case, that B, C, and
others associate themselves in corporate form and claim the
advantages specified in a certain chartering act. With some
of the provisions of the act they fail to comply. They en-
gage in business, buy goods in the common name from a
plaintiff who deals with them in the belief that they are
incorporated and are subsequently sued by him on the
theory that the irregularity of their organization leaves
them subject to the unlimited liability of principals. As-
suming the fact of agency to be established, the plaintiff
must succeed unless (I) the court inquires into the irregu-
larity and is of opinion that it is so trivial that even the
state could not take advantage of it; or unless (2) the court
applies the principle that, whether or not the irregularity
could be taken advantage of by the state, no one but the
state can raise the question; or unless (3) the court applies
'Johnson v. Corscr, 34 Minn. 355 (1885).
'Rutherford v. Hill, 22 Ore. 218 (892).
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some principle for the protect.ion of the defendants other
than the principle that they gain their immunity only from
the state: as, for example, (a) that the plaintiff is estopped
from asserting unlimited liability against them; or (b) that
by his contract he has bound himself not to do so; or (c)
that the defendants, by actually establishing a corporate or-
ganization, have secured a corporate status and; though sub-
ject to discipline by the state, are not subject to individual
liability to the plaintiff.
I. Examining these theories in succession, it may be as-
sumed that in the first case put the defendants have a valid
defence. If the defect in organization is so "trifling that a
judgment of ouster would not be pronounced against the
associates, of course they cannot be held liable by the
plaintiff5
2. In the second place, the court may decline to consider
the irregularity at all, on the ground that to do so would
be to inquire collaterally into acts done under the authority
of a co-ordinate branch of the government-an inquiry
which under certain circumstances the judiciary will decline
to make. The reason for the rule against collateral attack
is thus stated, by Parsons:
"When the franchise was a direct grant made by the Ex-
ecutive or Legislative department, the charter was deemed
the act of a co-ordinate branch of the Government, and, in
deference to the Political Power, was treated as a judgment
which could not be impeached collaterally." 8
Such being the principle (if principle it can be called),
it might be contended that its application should be confined
to the case of special grants of franchises by the legislature
'For a discussion of the principles which should govern a court in
determining whether or not the irregularities justify a judgment of
ouster, see the opinion of Nelson, C. J., in People v. Kingston and
Middletown Turnpike, 23 Wend. 193 (i84o). For the distinction between
cases in which the judgment should be a judgment of seizure and those
in which ouster is proper, see 2 Kyd Corp. 4o&
It is sometimes impossible to determine from an opinion whether the
court regards the irregularities as too trivial to be attacked by the
state or whether the court means that they are merely beyond the reach
of private attack. See, for example, Finnegan v. Norenberg, Sz Minn.
239 (1893)6
IJames Parsons on Partn. 12d Ed.) p. g&.
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or the executive. If the principle were to be thus restricted
it would have no application to cases in which the legislature
sanctions self-incorporation under a general law. In other
words, the principle would be inapplicable to the vast ma-
jority of the cases which to-day come before the courts.
Such a restriction upon the application of the principle was
recognized and enforced in Paterson v. Arnold.7
On the other hand, the principle might be extended in its
application to all cases of organization under a legislative
grant irrespective of whether-the grant Was special or gen-
eral. The limitation recognized in Paterson v. Arnold was
ignored five years later by the same court when the earlier
decision was overruled." The modern cases which invoke
the doctrine of collateral attack make no distinction between
special charters and incorporation effected under general
lavs.
The principle which forbids collateral attack upon the
regularity of the organization presupposes the existence of a
law under which a regular organization might have been
effected. Where, therefore, a law contained no sanction for
the organization of a banking corporation it was held that
associates who had assumed to organize under the law and
had obtained from the executive authority a certificate of
corporate existence were nevertheless liable to be put into
bankruptcy individually at the petition of those who had de-
posited money in their bank.9 Whether an unconstitutional
law affords sufficient basis for the application of the doctrine
under consideration is a question upon which, as might be
expected, judges have differed.10 The original basis for the
rule forbidding collateral attack seems to have been long
ago lost sight of. The doctrine is nowadays invoked merely
'Pa. 410 (I863).
'Cochran v. Arnold, 58 Pa. 399 (868).
* Da'vis Y. Stevens, io4 ed. Rep. 235 (19OO).
"In favor of the view that when the law is unconstitutional the doc-
trine does not apply are Eaton v. Valker, 76 Mich..579 (1889), and
Heaston v. Railroad Co., 16 Ind. 275 (1861). In favor of the view that
the doctrine should be applied even where the law is invalid are Winget
v. Quincy. etc., Ass'n, 128 Ill. 67 (1889); Building, etc., Ass'n v.
Chamberlain. 4 S. D. 27i (1893) ; Richards v. Minnesota Savings Bank,
75 Minn. 196 (1899).
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to furnish a reason for securing corporate privileges to asso-
ciates where they have in fact formed a corporate organiza-
tion. As the use of the doctrine has become merely fictional
it is difficult to see why the courts should not apply it as
well where the law is, unconstitutional as where it is consti-
tutionaL
In order that the doctrine may be applied, not only must
there be a law which confers corporate privileges, but it must
appear that the associates have acted as if under the protec-
tion of the franchise. This thought is expressed in the
phrase that the associates will not be -protected unless there
is "proof of user" of corporate franchises. Implied in this
statement is the thought that they must have brought them-
selves into some relation to the state by conduct evidencing
an intention to act under a special charter," or by filing a
certificate of incorporation under a general law. It has al-
ready been pointed out that there may be defects in organiza-
tion so trivial that a judgment of ouster would not be pro-
nounced against the associates in a proceeding instituted by
the state. Other irregularities are so serious that the asso-
ciates will, if the state proceeds against them, be ousted from
the exercise of the privileges which they claim. An attempt
is made in the cases to draw a distinction between different
irregularities of the latter class. In some cases the irregu-
larity before the court is said not to be such as will be in-
quired into under the operation of the collateral attack doc-
trine. In other cases the doctrine is not regarded as afford-
ing protection to associates who in the opinion of the court
have altogether failed to bring themselves within the terms
of the statute. To make a rational classification of these
cases is obviously impossible. A practical distinction may be
made between those in which a certificate of incorporation
has been filed and those in which this step has not been
taken.12 The tendency of the courts is to limit the protective
effect of the doctrine of collateral attack to cases of the for-
mer class. In McLcnnan v. Hopkins 13 the Court said:
"Railroad Co. v. Cary, 26 N. Y. 75 (1862).
"See, for example, the language of Sterrett, C. J., in Guckert v.
Hacke, 159 Pa. 303 (1893).
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"The attempt to incorporate referred to in that case [Pape v.
Capitol Bank, 2o Kan. -4o] must be something more than
mere physical organization or formal arrangement into a
working force of the promoters of the enterprise. Some-
thing must be done beyond the mere transaction of the busi-
ness in the manner and form usually adopted by corpora-
tions. There must also be something more tangible and
effective than a mere mental operation in the direction of
what is intended."
The same problem is dealt with in a different form when
an attempt is made to distinguish between those. provisions
of the chartering act which are to be construed as conditions
precedent and those which are to be treated as conditions
subsequent to the grant of corporate privileges. A statute
provided that no act of incorporation should take effect
until the incorporators had paid a tax into the public treas-
ury. An organization had been effected, the tax was unpaid,
and A became a stockholder. B recovered judgment against
the association and issued execution against A's land under
a provision in the act making stockholders liable in case of
failure to file a certain certificate in each year. A sought tco
enjoin the execution on the ground that incorporation had
never been -effected. The court were of opinion that the
existence of the company as a corporation might be ques-
tioned in a collateral proceeding because " the act of incor-
poration being inoperative there never was any corporation
to incur forfeiture or any charter to be forfeited." They
were further of opinion however that A was " estopped"
from denying the existence of the corporation and that his
property was subject to levy and sale."' For the statute
under discussion -in the above case there was subsequently
substituted by the Rhode Islan'd Legislature a provision that
" no corporation shall be organized under a charter until the
petitioners . . . shall pay into the general treasury for the
use of the state one hundred dollars." The same court which
decided the Slocum case held that the changed language was
" Slocurn v. Providence Steam and Gas Pipe Co., and Slocum v.
Warren, io R. I. 112, 116 (1871). This case, in so far as the question
of estoppel is concerned, is discussed infra, p. 474.
IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.
to be construed as requiring something to be done- after the
charter had gone into effect and that non-compliance with
the requirement could be taken advantage of only by the
state.15 The general tendency in modem cases is to diminish
the number of irregularities which, will result in subjecting
the associates .to liability and to construe statutory provisions
as conditions subsequent rather than as conditions precedent.
In applying the doctrine of collateral attack the question
arises whether the doctrine extends only to the case of statu-
tory associations deemed to be corporations by the legisla-
ture or whether it extends also to statutory associations of
whatever kind. In Eliot v. Himrod'8 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania declined to give the benefit of the doctrine
to persons associated under a statute providing for the for-
mation of companies with limited liability styled "partner-
ship associations" by the legislature.17 In Stayer Mfg. Co.
v. Blake 1 protection from liability was afforded to mem-
bers of a similar association and the court declined to follow
the Pennsylvania rule. The decision, however, -was based
not upon the principle forbidding collateral attack but upon
a doctrine of so-called estoppel. It should seem that a sub-
stantial distinction might be drawn between associations
against which the state may proceed by quo warranto or in-
formation in the nature thereof and those which are not
subject to the exercise of these extraordinary remedies. In
the latter instance, since there can be no direct attack the
conception of collateral attack becomes impossible.
It is an important question whether the doctrine can be in-
voked by those who are themselves guilty of the irregulari-
ties or whether it is available only for those who are their in-
nocent associates or successors. In Paterson v. Arnold,
supra, the court undertook to make a distinction and granted
immunity only to those who had had no part in forming the
irregular association. In Cochran v. Arnold this distinction
was swept away and immunity -was conceded to all alike.
" Hughesdale Mfg. Co. v. Vanner, r2 R. 1. 491 (188o.)
28 io8 Pa. 569 (1885).
" Act of June 2, 1874, P. L 271. P. & L col. 3401-3410.1 6_Q N. w. So8 (i896).
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On principle the latter view appears to be correct. On the
theory under discussion protection is given to the defendants
not because of their own merits, but because the proceeding
instituted by the plaintiff is not one suitable for an inquiry
into their conduct. It may be doubted, however, whether (as
a practical matter) protection would be given to associates
who exercise corporate privileges without any color of reason
for supposing themselves entitled to them. This would seem
to be the situation which courts have in mind when it is said
that associates are committing a fraud upon the chartering
act.19 Whether or not, upon the estoppel theory, a valid
distinction can be drawn between the original associates and
their innocent successors is a question which will be con-
sidered presently.
20
Questions respecting irregularity of organization usually
relate to the formation of the group. . Sometimes, however,
the case presents itself in which associates continue to act in
corporate form after the date fixed for the expiration of the
charter. What is the legal character of these acts? No
case has been found in which an attempt has been made to
enforce liability under such circumstances, but in Bradley v.
Reppell, 133 Mo. 545 (1895), the court denied effect to a
deed of lands given in the common name after the expiration
of the charter. As far as the doctrine of collateral attack is
concerned, no sufficient reason appears why an inquiry
should be permitted into the continuance of the chartered
grant more than into the commencement of it. The weight
of authority, however, is on the side of this decision.
Upon the whole, it is suggested that the attempt to in-
voke the doctrine of collateral attack to secure immunity for
the members of modem business associations is altogether
unsatisfactory. The reason for the rule is no longer present
when corporate privileges have by a general law been put
within the reach of all citizens in the community and when
the state has bound itself to grant the privileges upon appli-
cation without reserving discretion as to whether they shall
" See the language of the chancellor in Stout v. Zulick, 48 N. J. Law,
59 r (1886).
Infra, P. 427.
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be given or withheld. Moreover, the doctrine, as-has just
been seen, cannot consistently be applied to associations not
regarded by the legislature as corporations; and the result
is that under precisely similar conditions associates may find
themselves protected if they have organized under a so-called
corporation law but may find themselves without protection
if organization has been effected under a statute of a dif-
ferent name although not distinguishable from the other
in principle. Where the constitutionality of the chartering
act is disputed vexed questions arise upon the decision of
which the liability or immunity of the associates is made to
depend. Since, by supposition, immunity might be conceded
in spite of non-compliance with a constitutional statute, it is
an artificial rule which denies immunity because that with
which the associates do not comply is unconstitutional. The
fact is that the pririciple of unlimited liability is nowadays
regarded by business men as inconsistent with commercial
interest. In all manner of ways the relaxation of the princi-
ple is making itself manifest. It is, however, a characteristic
of English legal thought to deal with such a situatioh by
assuming the principle still to exist in undiminished vigor
and then to invent a fictional doctrine to check the applica-
tion of the principle. It is conceived that the modern de-
velopment of the collateral attack doctrine is an instance
of such a fiction. It can have no permanent place in a sound
legal system. Either the principle of unlimited liability must
reassert itself or there must be a frank recognition that
limited liability may be secured otherwise than by public
grant-
In concluding this branch of the discussion, the question
may be raised whether the doctrine of collateral attack has
any proper reason for existing under a system in which the
judiciary may declare legislative acts unconstitutional. If a
court not only may but, in a proper case, must in a collatiral
proceeding nullify a statute, it is a strange policy which
denies to the court the right to inquire whether the pro-
visions of a valid statute have been complied with.
3. (a) The plaintiff who seeks to enforce the liability of
principals against the associates may, however, be met by a
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defence of an entirely different character from that which
has just been discussed. In many cases it is said that the
plaintiff is "estopped" from asserting an unlimited liability
against the defendants. This statement either means
nothing more than the assertion that the plaintiff is stopped
or precluded from recovering (which is obviously not a
reason for the conclusion but a mere assertion thereof), or
it means that the familiar elements of an estoppel by conduct
are present, or it means that the plaintiff is not in a position
to enforce a larger liability against the associates than they
in fact authorized their agents to subject them to. In a few
cases the elements of a true estoppel may be detected, but
in most of the cases in which the term is used its use is
either meaningless or is referable to the agency principle just
mentioned. If it appears that at the time he made the con-
tract in suit the plaintiff knew of irregularities in the de-
fendants' organization, and that the defendants did not
know of them and could not have ascertained them by
reasonable diligence, a case of true estoppel might be made
out.21  On the other hand, if the plaintiff did not know
of the irregularities and the defendants either knew of
them or might have known of them, it does not seem
reasonable to say that the plaintiff is estopped. On such
a state of facts the courts, however, often advance a doc-
trine of estoppel to explain a decision favorable to the asso-
ciates.22 If the plaintiff not only did not know of the
irregularities, but did not know that the defendants even
purported to be organized in corporate form, it is clear that
no estoppel can be asserted.P
If the plaintiff believes the corporation to be regularly
organized and the defendants are cognizant of defects, it is
still clearer than in the former case that no estoppel arises in
favor of the defendants.
The situation which most often presents itself is that in
which all parties believed the organization to be regular at
No reported case has been found which presents this state of facts.
=Snidcr's Sons Co. v. Troy, 9I Ala. 224 (i8go).
IGuckert v. Hacke, i59 Pa. 3o3 (893); New York, etc., Bank v.
Cro'cll, 177 Pa. 313 (x896).
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the time the plaintiff gave credit to the defendants. It is
probable that the case thus supposed does not differ from the
case suggested above in which the associates know of the
irregularities or might ascertain them by reasonable dili-
gence. From this situation the elements of estoppel by con-
duct are absent. A sells goods to the D company and sub-
sequently sues B and others as principals, averring that D
was never in fact incorporated. A demurrer is filed to a plea
setting out certain steps towards an incorporation and.
alleging that the debt now sued for was contracted by D as
a corporation and not otherwise and that A dealt with D as a
corporation and not as a partnership or association of in-
dividuals. The court decides that this demurrer should be
overruled. "It is conceded," said the court, "that the rule
(i.c., of estoppel) has been invoked and applied most fre-
quently in suits against the stockholders of a corporation or
persons who have contracted with them where the stock-
holder or corporation or person is seeking to avoid a liability
by denying the legality of the corporate organization. But
why should it not be applicable in other cases? .. .Why
should not the estoppel be mutual?" 24
It is submitted that when a court reaches the conclusion
that both parties to a transaction are estopped the true basis
of the decision is not the doctrine of estoppel, but the idea
of a contract obligation between the parties or a recognition
that the associates have in fact created a corporate organiza-
tion and have thus displaced the principle of unlimited lia-
bility. In the case last cited the court seem to have been
aware that their expanded doctrine of estoppel shades in-
sensibly into contract obligation. "When a party," the
opinion proceeds, "deals and contracts with a corporation
as corporators, exemption from individual liability enters as
an element of the contract." At this point the judge seems
to fear that the implication of limited liability from intention
may operate too broadly, as, for example, in the case of per-
sons who have assumed the status of partners without in-
tending to be liable. The judge therefore observes: "A
Snider's Sons Co. v: Troy, jupra.
r
IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.
corporation de facto has an independent status recognized by
the law as distinct from that of its members. A partnership
is not the necessary legal consequence of an abortive attempt
at incorporation." This opinion is a peculiarly interesting
one, for it will be observed that the court take in succession
all the positions which it is possible to take in favor of the
immunity of the defendants. In the earlier part of the
opinion the collateral attack doctrine is relied upon. Then
the court works out an estoppel. Next there is a suggestion
of a contract and finally there is a dim recognition of in-
corporation as resulting from the act of the associates not-
withstanding a failure to conform to the requirements of the
chartering statute.
In Slocum v. Warren 25 the question was whether irregu-
larity in organization was available as a defence to a stock-
holder against whose separate estate execution was issued
under the provisions of a statute imposing unlimited liability
in certain cases. It does not appear to have been disputed
that the associates had engaged in business and that the
debt in question was contracted in the regular course of
business. Under these circumstances the stockholder was
clearly liable. If no corporate organization were regarded
as existing, the stockholder was subject to unlimited liability
like any other principal. If, however, incorporation had been
attained, he was liable in accordance with the provisions of
the statute. The court were of opinion that no incorpora-
tion had been effected and proceeded to reason thus: "The
question then is whether the stockholder who does nothing
but hold his stock is estopped when pursued by a creditor of
the supposed corporation from denying its existence. We
think he is so estopped. By becoming and continuing a
stockholder he holds himself out as a corporator and so con-
tributes to the belief that the company with which he is
associated is a corporation." In the cases heretofore ex-
amined the question whether or not incorporation has been
effected has been the vital question. Here the question really
a lo R .i2, x16 (1871). This case was discussed supra, p. 418, in
connection with the subject of collateral attack.
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became immaterial because the privilege of limited liability
was by statute, under certain conditions, denied to the mem-
bers of incorporated groups. To introduce the conception of
estoppel into such a case is to give an artificial reason for
reaching a sound conclusion.
A question somewhat similar to that presented in Slocum
v. Warren was considered in Eaton v. Aspinwall."8  The
court declared that a stockholder was precluded from setting
up an irregularity in organization as a defence to an action
charging him with statutory liability as a shareholder in a
steamship company. It appears that the business was
actually launched and that the defendant had attended a
meeting of the stockholders and had taken part in their
proceedings. Whether or not incorporation had been
effected, he was liable. The court, however, preferred to
base his liability on the conception of a reciprocal estoppel.
In Utley v. Union Tool Co. 2 7 a statutory liability was
sought to be imposed upon a stockholder who defended
on the ground that the corporation had been irregularly
organized. The court were of opinion that the defendant
was not liable, as there was "an absolute want of proof
that any corporation was ever called into being which
had the power of contracting debts or of rendering persons
liable therefor as stockholders." Such a decision can best
be defended on the theory that the plaintiff's right to re-
cover in the form of action which he invoked was dependent
upon proof of incorporation. That the court did not mean to
deny the possible liability of the defendant if an action were
brought against him as a principal appears from the con-
cluding paragraph of the opinion: "We are not called on
now to say whether the plaintiffs have any remedy for the
collection of their debt against those who participated in the
transactions connected with the attempted organization of
the supposed corporation. It is sufficient for the decision of
this case that the respondents cannot be held liable in the
action for the debts of a corporation which has never had
any legal existence."
19 N. Y. 119 (1859).
i i Gray 139 (1858).
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In the last analysis it appears that the elements of a true
estoppel are wanting in most of the cases in which that term
has been invoked to explain the decision. It is clear, how-
ever, that implicit in these decisions is the view that not much
sympathy should be wasted on a-plaintiff who was willing
to accept limited liability when he made his bargain. He is
not harmed if the associates are given the immunity which he
believed them to possess: -When thd associates chose the
officers or agents through whom they contracted with the
plaintiff, they certainly did not give these agents authority to
subject them to anything more than a limited liability. If
the agents had no authority to pledge the entire estate of the
stockholder, on what ground can the plaintiff rest his claim?
If it be said that secret restrictions upon an authority ap-
parently general are unavailing against third persons, the
answer is that here there was no appearance of a general
authority. The plaintiff walked with his eyes open into a
bargain with agents who appeared to have, and in fact did
have, nothing but a limited authority. The situation sug-
gests the analogy of a plaintiff who is not permitted to hold
the defendant liable for negligence because his own negli-
gence has contributed to the result. If the plaintiff did not
know that the associates were organized in corporate form,
the suggested defence would notbe available.. If the plaintiff
dealt with the defendants directly and not through agents,
the question under consideration would not arise.. The prob-
lem is one of agency. Let it be supposed that X and others
propose to organize a bank. They effect a corporate organi-
zation but, in fact, obtain no charter. X represents to B that
the bank is regularly incorporated. B subscribes to several
shares of stock on the basis of this assurance. He receives
dividends but takes no part in the management of the busi-
ness. X and the other officers carry on the business in cor-
porate form and A makes a deposit in the belief that the
institutiofi is an incorporated bank. A subsequently ascer-
tains the facts and sues B for his deposit. Here B never
gave to X anything but a limited authority. The plaintiff is
in no better position than a plaintiff who deals with a general
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agent but, in fact, has notice of a specific restriction upon his
authority. B should not be held liable to A.2
It was suggested, when the subject of collateral attack
was under discussion, that no distinction should be made be-
tween original associates irregularly organized and their in-
nocent successors. On the footing of agency, however, there
is room for a distinction. If the plaintiff makes his contract
with participants in the irregular organization, the circum-
stances may or may not be such that theseparticipants will
be subject to unlimited liability. If they are not, of course
their innocent successor will not be. But even if the original
participants could have been held liable by a plaintiff who
dealt with them, it does not follow that a plaintiff who deals
with the agents acting for the innocent successors can en-
force an unlimited liability. The- problem again becomes a
problem of agency; and again it may be said that the defen-
dants have given nothinZ but a limited authority and that
the plaintiff has in no way been misled.
The doctrine of collateral attack has now been examined
and has been found unsatisfactory. The precedents in
which the elements of a true estoppel are present are so
rare as to be almost a negligible quantity. It follows that,
if a case is one in which the agency principle cannot be in-
voked, the defence must fail unless it can be sustained on
one or the other of the theories which it is now proposed
to consider.n2
3. (b) The conception of a contractual limit to liability
has been discussed incidentally when the doctrine of es-
toppel was under consideration. Stated in its simplest form,
this doctrine is that the plaintiff who has contracted with
associates purporting to be incorporated is confined to a
Upon the facts stated in the text the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania have refused to permit a recovery. Hallstead & Coleman, z43 Pa.
352 (g89i) ; Gibbs's Estate, 157 Pa. 59 (1893). It is submitted that the
decision can be sustained only on the ground just stated or on the
ground (presently to be discussed) that associates attain immunity by
forming a corporate group even if the organization is unlicensed.
, For the suggestion that in many of the so-called estoppel cases the
courts are perhaps unconsciously applying the agency principle and for
the justification of the decision in Gibbs's Estate (s-upra) on this theory
the writer is indebted to Mr. Henry S. Drinker, Jr., of the class of x9o4
in the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania.
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recourse against the common fund in virtue of an implication
to that effect in his contract. Where the question relates
merely to the right of the plaintiff to sue the associates in
their common name or their right to bring suit in that name
the contract theory is of much more simple application than
is the case where liability is under discussion. If the parties
have made a written contract in which the associates are
described by a name fairly indicative of corporate organiza-
tion, it may be said with some reason that the associates
have impliedly agreed to submit to suit in the common
name and that by a similar implication they have a right
to sue as plaintiffs in that name. To assert, however, that
the plaintiff really meant to give up substantive legal rights
against the individual associates in case such rights were his
and that the associates really intended to stipulate for pro-
tection from unlimited liability is to strain the contract con-
ception almost to the breaking point.
As has been seen, however, the doctrine is not without
support in the cases. In Snider's Sons Co. v. Troy"o the
contract theory is invoked in aid of the decision. In Stout
v. Zilick 3 1 A sued B and others for the price of goods
sold to the X company. Recovery was refused. The
opinion commingles almost indistinguishably the contract
conception with the collateral attack theory and the estoppel
doctrine. The contract conception is, however, definitely
present, it being, of course, conceived that the parties to
the contract were A and the corporate entity. "It will be
seen," said the court, "that the goods were not sold to the
defendants but to the company." And again, "The con-
tract was not with the defendants, but with the company,
and the defendants were guilty of no fraud." In Guckert
v. Hacke 3 2 a plaintiff was permitted to recover against
associates who had failed to record their charter in accord-
ance with the provisions of the general corporation law.
After observing that no estoppel could be asserted because
plaintiff had no knowledge of the existence of the charter,
Supra, p. 423.
n48 N. J. L,99 (886).
159 Pa. 303 (1893).
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the court discussed the effect of the taking by the plaintiff
of a note in the corporate name to evidence the indebted-
ness which had already been created. "In the absence of
an express agreement," the court say, "the acceptance of
a note from the defendants as a corporation after plaintiff
had performed his part of the contract cannot operate by
way of election or estoppel. The relation of the parties was
fixed by their status when the original contract was made.
and cannot be changed by gratuitous inference." It should
seem that the conclusion thus reached would be reached
also if the defendants were asserting immunity by contract:
that is to say, it would be held that their immunity or
liability depended upon the contract as originally made
and not upon the terms of a note subsequently given to
evidence the obligation.
It should seem to be a legitimate application of the con-
tract theory to hold that, if limited liability is a term of
the contract, this term will be enforced not only between
the original parties, but between assignees of both or be-
tween one of them and the assignee of the other. The
doctrine would not, however, be applicable to a case in which
the contract as originally made was between two individuals
and the promisor is sued by a defectively organized group
of associates claiming to be assignees of the promisee. As
will be seen hereafter, there is authority for the obviously
just view that under such circumstances the defendant is
liable to the associates upon the note.33 But such a case
cannot be explained upon the contract theory.
Not only does the contract theory assume an intention
in many cases where there is no intention in fact and not
only is it inapplicable in cases in which the associates appear
as assignees of one of the parties, but the theory fails to
take account of the situation presented when the liability
sought to be enforced is not contractual in its character.
Suppose that the servant of the associates commits a tort
in the regular course of the business which they are carry-
ing on in corporate form and the question is whether A,
'Pape v. Capital Bank, 2o Kan. 44o (1878).
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the injured plaintiff, can enforce unlimited liability against
the associates. The contract theory obviously furnishes us
with no principle upon which such a problem can be solved.
The same observation may be made with respect to the
estoppel doctrine. In such a case the associates are liable
unless they are protected by the collateral attack doctrine or
unless it be conceded that unlimited liability is displaced
when corporate organization has in fact been accomplished.
If the objections made above to the collateral attack doc-
trine be regarded as valid, there is no ground on which the
associates can resist liability except such as is afforded by a
recognition of the theory last referred to.
An interesting variation of the tort problem arises when
associates organize irregularly under the law of one state
and then do business in another state which does not sanc-
tion incorporation for the pursuit of the business in which
they are in fact engaged. In such a case, if an agent com-
mits a tort in the second state, the question will arise
whether unlimited liability can be enforced by the injured
plaintiff against owners of shares in the property or busi-
ness of the group. As neither estoppel nor contract is avail-
able for the stockholders' protection, the question is whether
he can invoke the collateral attack doctrine or the theory of
private incorporation. The theory of private international
law that b , comity effect will be given by one state to the
legislation of another is qualified by the proviso that such
legislation must not be inconsistent with the policy of the
state which is asked to give effect to it. The collateral
attack doctrine has never been and probably never will be
extended so far as to preclude an inquiry into the question
whether such inconsistency exists. The effect of the mere
absence of a lav authorizing incorporation in the second
state for the purpose in question might or might not be
regarded as equivalent to the absence of a law authorizing
such incorporation in the first state. If, for example, state
A authorizes incorporation of a drainage company and state
B does not, it is conceivable that a court in state B might
or might not regard the absence of statutory authority'for
such incorporation as an indication of hostility to groups
430
IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.
of that class. 4  If, however, the legislation of state B not
only does not authorize incorporation for the purpose of
that business, but makes regulations for its conduct which
manifest an intention that it shall not be carried on by
corporate groups, or not by foreign corporate groups, it
seems clear that no effect should be given by a court in state
B to the legislation of state A; under such circumstances
the result is that there is no law in state B authorizing in-
corporation. In a situation of this kind the collateral attack
doctrine can have no application. 5
It also seems clear that in the suggested case no theory of
private incorporation should be permitted to protect from
individual liability associates who have sought to organize
themselves in pursuit of a business which consistently with
the law of the state cannot be carried on in corporate form.
If neither the collateral attack doctrine nor the theory
of private incorporation is available as a defence, the stock-
holder must respond to the plaintiff in damages in virtue of
his position as an undisclosed principa 6
3. (c) As a result of the discussion of the collateral
attack theory and of the estoppel and contract doctrines it
appears that no one of them furnishes a satisfactory basis
upon which to rest the immunity of the associates in de
facto corporation cases. The very cases, however, which
profess to apply one or another of these doctrines are cases
in which an entirely different doctrine is seen to be strug-
gling for recognition. It is the doctrine that the usual inci-
dents of incorporation are attainable without concession
from the state by associates who form a group with a repre-
'"In fact, the law appears to be settled in favor of the recognition by
state A of the corporate right of persons associated under the law of
state B when the law of A makes no provision for incorporation for
the purpose in question. See Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co., ioo
U. S. S (1879).
Davis v. Stevens, supra, p. 416.
"Let it be supposed that A contracts in state B with the agent of
associates organized under the laws of state C who have not regis-
tered in B as required by the foreign corporation law of that state.
A should be permitted in B to hold the associates liable as princi-
pals. A possible view is that the agent, having no incorporated prin-
cipals in B, may himself be held liable without limit by a court
sitting in B. A decision to this effect is Lasher v. Stimson, x45 Pa
30 (1892).
sentative organization and actually conduct business in cor-
porate form. Our attention is thus called to a wide-spread
tendency to displace the unlimited liability which by the
common law is imposed upon every one for acts done by
him or by another in his service. As a matter of fact, un-
limited individual liability, although spoken of with rever-
ence by many authorities, 7 is regarded as of relatively small
importance in modern business. One who lends money
without security is regarded, except under peculiar circum-
stances, as inviting the loss which usually follows. Indeed,
it is not uncommon to hear one who lends without security
blamed for putting the borrower in a false position by
lending him money which there could be no real expecta-
tion of getting back. The note or bond accompanying a
mortgage has come to be considered a small element of
security. It is usual for a borrower to convey his property
to a man of straw who executes the bond and mortgage
and reconveys the property subject to the lien. It is be-
coming more and more easy for stockholders whose stock
is not full paid to escape further liability by transfers made
for that very purpose. Limited liability is regarded as a
matter of course in all manner of statutory associations.
Whether the policy of the legislatures in making the limi-
tation so general is responsible for the contemporary view
of the subject or whether legislation merely reflects the
economic tendency is a question not easy to answer. In
such matters legislation is usually less radical than the aver-
age public opinion. The courts made an important contri-
bution to this most dangerous result when they perpetuated
the idea approved by Blackstone that incorporation neces-
sarily involves a limitation of liability. Neither historically
nor on principle-is there necessity for such a conception,
but it has become part of our law.3 8 The modem law on
this point, both in England and in the United States,
whether it be vise or unwise, is stated by Cave, J., in corn-
V E.g., Lindley Comp. 354 (6th Ed)..
'Carr v. Iglehart, 3 Ohio St. 457 ( 4). Blackstone (Bk. I, c. I8,
p. 485, Lewis's Ed.) adopts the maxim of the civil law, "Si quid
universitati debetur, singulis non debetur; nec, quod debet univer-
sitas, singuli debent."
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menting upon the argument of counsel for creditors in In
re Shefield and South Yorkshire Permanent Bldg. Soc.
"He argued that persons who unite together for trading
or making profits in any way are at common law liable for
all debts which are incurred during the time they are mem-
bers of the association, and that, if the association has ulti-
matelv to be wound up, past members must pay their shares
of the debts. As a general rule-apart from legislation-
that is perfectly true with respect to partners, and to asso-
ciations in the nature of partnership where there is no
incorporation, but with respect to corporations the case is
entirely different when the legislature has not thought fit
to intervene, or where the charter under which the body is
incorporated does not provide otherwise. A corporation is
a legal persona just as much as an individual; and, if a man
trusts a corporation, he trusts that legal persona, and must
look to its assets for payment: he can only call upon indi-
vidual members to contribute in case the act or charter has
so provided." 
40
This assumption that limited liability is a necessary in-
cident of incorporation is believed to be the source of much
" Q22Q. B. D. 476 (x8ft).
SThe dangers incident to the restriction of individual liability are
well stated by Gibson, J., in Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 356 (188).
"The absolving of corporators from personal responsibility has always
a greater or less tendency to fraud. While there is a divided responsi-
bility to public opinion, the odium due to misconduct is bandied from
one to another, till at length it rests nowhere; and we sometimes see
men do things in a corporate character which, as individuals, they would
blush to be thought capable of. Hence, a necessity of holding them in
check by individual interest. Private associations, therefore, attempt-
ing to arrogate to themselves the attributes of a corporation are entitled
to no indulgence, and more particularly this association, which carried
on its operations in open defiance of the laws of the country. An ex-
emption from individual liability is the most substantial benefit derived
from a charter; the having perpetual succession, ability to sue and be
sued, corporately, etc., are only matters of convenience that may be
dispensed with. The defendants attempted, if they designed this clause
for individual exoneration, to secure to themselves the substantial
benefit of a corporate character in a business forbidden by law to all
but corporate bodies. They have, therefore, no claim to an indulgent
construction; and I am of opinion the legal meaning of the contract is
that they are personally liable."
The case was one in which members of an association styled "The
Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank" were held liable as principals on cer-
tain notes in the nature of bank-notes containing a promise to pay "out
of their joint funds according to their articles of association."
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of the'difficulty of the subject. Incorporation really has to
do with modes of action, not utith consequences of action.
When associates are incorporated they may act and be acted
upon in accordance with representative principles. The
right to form a highly organized group ought not to be
regarded as derivable only from the state. But the right
to secure immunity from liability is a right which ought
not to be acquired except by public consent. Were it not
for the insistence that incorporation involves the idea of
limited liability the problem of irregular organization would
be relatively easy of solution. As respects all rights but that
of limited liability it could be said without much hesitation
that the associates had in fact attained them by organizing
a corporate group, whether or not they had organized regu-
larly. As respects limited liability it should be said that
the limitation could be had only by legislative grant and
that the associates had not satisfied the terms of the grant.
But it might further be said that the plaintiff must establish
his rights in a suit against the associates in their common
name because the obligation is corporate, leaving him free
to enforce individual liability under the common judgment.
As to the mode in which, after judgment against the group,
liability might be enforced against the individual member,
the development might take place along either of two lines:
(x) the partnership mode, by execution against either com-
mon property or the separate estate or both; (2) the cor-
poration mode, by access to the separate estate (either in
equity, by action at law, or alias execution) only after the
common fund has been exhausted.' 1
It being the fact that limited liability is by modern custom
accorded to many debtors, and it being conceded that limited
liability is nowadays an incident of regular statutory organi-
zation, the important question is whether limited liability
can be attained by irregular as well as by regular organiza-
' This suggestion respecting the plaintiff's obligation to establish his
claim in a suit against the associates in their common name would have
nothing but an academic interest were it not for the fact that some such
conception appears to have been in the mind of the courts which de-
cided Utley v. Union Tool Co. (supra, p. 425), and Gibbs's Estate,
supra, p. 427.
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tion? To answer the question in the negative is to refuse
recognition to the conditions which result from the Ameri-
can decisions. To give an affirmative answer is (excepting
where the defendant's immunity can. be explained on agency
principles) to recognize the possibility of incorporation by
the priate act of the associates. To choose between these
two alternatives is a responsibility which courts cannot
escape. Longer to make fictional applications of a collateral
attack theory and an estoppel doctrine is inconsistent with
intellectual self-respect. To develop the contract theory is
to give the name of contract to an obligation not really con-
sensual. Therefore it is necessary to choose between ad-
herence to the common-law principle of unlimited liability
and a view which enables associates to limit their liability
but leaves the state free to regulate the conditions under
which the limitation may be lawfully effected. Frankly to
abandon the unhistorical concession theory and to limit the
function of the state to the regulation of associations formed
by the parties is to furnish a rational explanation of a mass
of cases in which collateral attack and estoppel and contract
are at present mingled in distressing confusion.
In Staver Mfg. Co. "v. Blake (supra) the court makes
this observation: " If these defendants in the absence of
any statute had associated themselves upon the same terms
as those provided by this statute, had limited their liability
in the same manner and for the same amount, had furnished
plaintiff with a copy of that agreement, and he had sold
them goods, the law would not permit him to recover
against them either as individuals or as partners.' If the
court means that the creditor would under such circum-
stances be notified of a limitation upon the authority of the
agents of the group, the observation is sound. If the court
means more than this, the only rational ground upon which
to base the result is the possibility of attaining incorpora-
tion by private act notwithstanding irregularities in the
organization. The same remarks may be made of Gibbs's
Estate, in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania gave
'Supra, p. 427, 157 Pa 59 (1893).
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immunity to one of several coproprietors of a banking busi-
ness by declaring that the plaintiff, a depositor, had not dis-
charged the burden of proving the defendant a partner. The
conception of private incorporation is immanent in Society v.
Cleveland (infra) and in Snider's SonsCo. v. Troy (supra).
In case after case results are ascribed to the operation of prin-
ciples which, upon analysis, are found not to be applicable.
It remains for the courts to recognize and avow the real
significance of their own decisions or else render those de-
cisions obsolete by enforcing liability in every case in which
there has not been substantial compliance with a constitu-
tional statute. By " substantial" is meant such compliance
as would be regarded as sufficient to prevent a judgment of
ouster from going against the associates.
To make a wise choice between these alternatives requires
that a judge shall consider the economic consequences of an
abolition of unlimited liability. To remove the sanction of
unlimited liability is to do in the field of law that which
is analogous to the weakening, in the domain of ethics, of
the sense of personal accountability. In the opinion of the
writer, legislative grants of limited liability have been far
too freely made in this country. The courts have only ag-
gravated the evil by conceding immunity in cases of irregu-
lar organization. A judge may, however, well conclude that
as a practical matter the mass of precedent cannot be disre-
garded and that he will recognize incorporation by private
act and leave it to the legislature to punish those who limit
their liability without a license. Upon this view of the situa-
tion the inquiry in each case should hereafter be whether
the associates have in fact organized a group in a form for
which a charter or license might be had upon proper applica-
tion and for a purpose not inimical to the welfare of the
community. If they have, the next inquiry should be
whether they have actually begun business and acted through
the agencies common to associations of their type. If so,
limited liability and such other privileges as will be licensed
upon application should be recognized as pertaining to the
associates. Their status should be assimilated to that of a
man and a woman who, without license or ceremony, co-
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habit and announce themselves as husband and wife. Their
children are legitimate and the consequences of marriage
follow in respect to their property rights. To regulate mar-
riage, however, is an important duty of the state, and to
punish unlicensed marriages is an unquestionably sound
policy. So likewise is it of the utmost importance that the
state should regulate association and incorporation. The
formation of statutory groups otherwise than in accordance
with statutory provisions should be made a penal offence and
the penalty should be strictly imposed.4n
George Wharton Pepper.
(To be continued.)
42 In England the results last above outlined have been reached by
legislation. The following provisions are made by c. 48 of 63 and 64
Vict. by way of amendment to the Companies Acts: "Incorporation
ard Objects. i. (0) A certificate of incorporation given by the registrar
in respect of any association shall be conclusive evidence that -all the
requisitions of the Companies Acts in respect of registration and of
matters precedent and incidental thereto have been complied with, and
that the association is a company authorized to be registered and duly
registered under the Companies Acts.
(2) A statutory declaration by a solicitor of the High Court engaged
in the formation of the company or by a person named in the articles
of association as a director or secretary of the company of compliance
with all or any of the said requisitions shall be produced to the
registrar, and the registrar may accept this declaration as sufficient
evidence of such compliance.
(3) The incorporation of a company shall take effect from the date
of incorporation mentioned in the certificate of incorporation.
(4) This section applies to all certificates of incorporation, whether
given before or after the passing of this act
Sec. 28 of the same act is as follows: "If any person in any return,
report, certificate, balance sheet, or other document, required by or for
the purposes of this act, wilfully makes a statement false in any material
particular, knowing it to be false, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and on
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four
months, with or without-hard labor, and in either case to a fine in lieu
of or in addition to such imprisonment as aforesaid: Provided that
the fine imposed on summary conviction shall not exceed one hundred
pounds."
The effect of this enactment is in great measure to banish the question
of irregular organization from the realm of private litigation in Eng-
land. The statute does not, however, provide for the case in which
there has been a failure to obtain a certificate. By implication it may
be concluded that in such a contingency the associates could lay claim
to no corporate privileges whatever.
